Article 9

Freedom of thought, conscience and religion

Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice or observance.

Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.

This means that everyone is free to hold a range of views, beliefs and thoughts and to follow a religious faith. This right can never be restricted.

The right to manifest your belief, that is through prayer or diet or through dress or adornments, may only be limited is certain circumstances. Any interference can only be justified if it is necessary to meet the aim of public safety, protection of the rights and freedoms of others.

This requires respect for cultural and religious requirements; giving opportunities for prayer or to wear religious clothing; providing support to enable people to participate in their normal religious practices.

What this means for local authorities

Officials must be aware that their decisions or actions might interfere with a person’s right to manifest their religion or belief. Where circumstances mean that it is necessary to restrict that right,  they can only do so to the extent that is necessary to meet one of the stated aims. This requires a balance to be stuck between the rights of the individual and others.

This right may be particularly relevant for local authorities as employers and as providers of education. Consideration requires to be given, when drawing up or changing policies or practices, to whether these might conflict with someone’s religious belief, such as timetabling an examination or training course on a religious holiday or setting dress codes.

Case Law Examples

In Eweida, Chaplin, Ladele and McFarlane v UK, the European Court of Human Rights confirmed that where an individual’s religious observance impinges on the rights of others, some restrictions can be made. The Court ruled that individuals should not have to show their actions amounted to a mandatory requirement of their religion before they can have a legitimate complaint. Instead, it will be sufficient if the actions are “intimately linked" to the religion.

However, while the Court was willing to accept the argument that projection of a particular corporate image was a legitimate aim, in not allowing Ms Eweida to wear a cross visibly with her work uniform, an appropriate balance was not struck between her employer’s aim and Ms Eweida's right to demonstrate her religious beliefs in the workplace. 

In contrast, the uniform policy applied to Ms Chaplin, which restricted all jewellery including religious symbols, was implemented to protect the health and safety of nurses and patients and the Court found that the interference in that case was necessary. 

Both Ms Ladele and Mr McFarlane’s cases centred on the belief that same-sex relationships are contrary to God's teaching, with Ms Ladele refusing to conduct civil partnership ceremonies and Mr McFarlane refusing to offer psychosexual counselling to gay couples. The Court accepted that the employers’ actions requiring them to undertake these roles were taken with a view to services being provided in a manner which was free from discrimination. Where the religious observance clearly impinged on the rights of others, restriction was found necessary.

In this case, the Court departed from previous decisions and made it clear that it will not be acceptable for an employer to say that the claimant can resign to avoid the interference, but that should be considered when weighing up overall whether the restriction was reasonable in the particular circumstances.

In Begum v Denbigh High School, Ms Begum refused to attend school unless she could wear the jilbab, which was in contravention of the school uniform policy which allowed pupils to wear the shalwar kameeze, which she did not consider was compliant with her Islamic faith. The House of Lords decided that any breach of her right to manifest her religion was justified, in particular to protect the rights of other pupils who might feel pressured into wearing alternative forms of dress. The decision by the school was proportionate where the school had consulted the local community to assist in developing an inclusive school uniform policy which took into account the range of faiths of pupils attending the school.